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Ron Krotoszynski has written a very interesting interpretation 
and defense of Justice Breyer’s majority opinion in Noel Canning.1 In 
Krotoszynski’s account, the opinion is a paragon of “pragmatic 
formalism,”2 a two-step process that navigates deftly between the 
Scylla of hidebound formalism and the Charybdis of unmoored 
functionalism.3 The pragmatic formalist, Krotoszynski explains, begins 
by applying formalist tools, pulled from the standard textualist 
toolbox. In some cases, those tools will suffice to get to a determinate 
answer; if so, the pragmatic formalist is done. But the pragmatic 
formalist also recognizes that, in many situations, formalist tools are 
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 † Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. This Response was originally presented at the 
2015 Duke Law Journal Administrative Law Symposium, and I am grateful to the Symposium 
organizers and participants for their comments. Thanks also to Ron Krotoszynski, David Pozen, 
and Catherine Roach for helpful and thought-provoking comments on earlier drafts. Any 
remaining errors or infelicities are, of course, my own. 
 1. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). 
 2. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transcending Formalism and Functionalism in 
Separation-of-Powers Analysis: Reframing the Appointments Power After Noel Canning, 64 
DUKE L.J. 1513, 1533 (2015). Krotoszynski borrows the term from Martin Redish and Elizabeth 
Cisar. See id. at 1547 (citing Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: 
The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449 (1991)).  
 3. I leave it to adherents of two schools to argue over whether I have correctly assigned 
the monster and the whirlpool. Cf. James Gillray, Britannia Between Scylla & Charybdis 
(London, H. Humphrey 1793), available at http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/94509857.  
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underdeterminate;4 when one of those situations arises, he then turns 
to historical gloss5 and purposivist tools to guide the inquiry.6 In this 
way, Krotoszynski suggests, the pragmatic formalist avoids the pitfalls 
most commonly associated with straightforward formalism and 
straightforward functionalism:7 “Strict formalism presupposes that the 
text invariably offers clear answers, despite the fact that this is not 
always so. On the other hand, functionalism tends to undervalue the 
importance of the text when the Constitution does offer clear rules of 
the road.”8 Pragmatic formalism is, accordingly, that most precious of 
modern political devices: a “third way.”9 
I.  A FOURTH WAY: THE MULTIPLICITY-BASED ACCOUNT  
OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
At the risk of perpetuating a pernicious cycle of “way inflation,” 
I would like to suggest that there is a fourth way of viewing the 
separation of powers, one that brings politics more fully into the mix. 
I advance this understanding, which I have called a “multiplicity-
based” account of the separation of powers, in some detail 
elsewhere;10 here, I will provide only a brief summary. The label 
 
 4. On underdeterminacy, see Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing 
Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 473 (1987) (“The law is underdeterminate with respect 
to a given case if and only if the set of results in the case that can be squared with the legal 
materials is a nonidentical subset of the set of all imaginable results.”).  
 5. On historical gloss generally, see Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical 
Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012). For an application of 
historical-gloss arguments to recess appointments in particular, see Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. 
Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse 
Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2547962. 
 6. See Krotoszynski, supra note 2, at 1553–68.  
 7. “Formalism” and “functionalism” are here (and, I think, in Krotoszynski’s article) used 
as archetypes, with the clear understanding that there is, of course, significant variation within 
each camp. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in 
Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 21–22 (1998) (describing three 
different ways of characterizing the formalism/functionalism divide).  
 8. Krotoszynski, supra note 2, at 1545.  
 9. Id. at 1515. 
 10. The fullest discussion appears in JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: 
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS ch. 1–3 (book manuscript under 
contract with Yale Univ. Press) (on file with author) [hereinafter CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S 
CONSTITUTION]. Preliminary discussions have appeared in Josh Chafetz, Congress’s 
Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 768–78 (2012) [hereinafter Chafetz, Congress’s 
Constitution]; Josh Chafetz, Multiplicity in Federalism and the Separation of Powers, 120 YALE 
L.J. 1084, 1112–28 (2011). 
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“multiplicity-based” is meant to emphasize the ways in which claims 
of institutional authority multiply, overlap, and interact in a non-
hierarchical constitutional order. This understanding of the 
separation of powers asserts that political power is largely 
endogenous to politics—that is to say, that the authority possessed by 
political actors is neither stable nor determined by something outside 
of the political process. Rather, political power is, to a large extent, a 
consequence of political behaviors and activities. Those political 
behaviors and activities take place in a distinctively constitutional 
register when they are concerned, not with first-order questions of 
policy, but instead with second-order questions of the distribution of 
governmental authority. Constitutional politics, in short, is meta-
politics. The few relatively specific separation-of-powers provisions in 
the written Constitution should be understood primarily as providing 
the tools with which the branches engage in constitutional politics—
which is to say, the tools with which they contest with one another in 
the public sphere for decision-making authority in the context of live 
political disputes. These disputes are settled locally, as one-offs, in a 
manner that is acutely sensitive to the surrounding political 
circumstances. And although these settlements can certainly alter the 
playing field for future disputes, they do not provide global, binding, 
or eternal resolutions of large-scale separation-of-powers questions. 
This means that the distribution of constitutional power is dynamic, 
not static, and that its dynamism is a function, not of some abstract 
notion of which branch is best suited to wield some particular power, 
but rather of the politics of the day.11 
An example will help to make this more concrete. The 
Constitution provides that, “No Money shall be drawn from the 
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law,”12 
and, of course, Article I, section 7 specifies the procedures for making 
law, including bicameralism and presentment.13 If a middle-school 
civics exam asked how the federal government makes spending 
decisions, knowledge of those two constitutional provisions would 
suffice for a good answer. At a somewhat higher level of classroom 
sophistication, one might begin to talk about the differences between 
mandatory and discretionary spending, the structures and procedures 
 
 11. This assertion is fleshed out in significantly more detail in CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at ch. 1.  
 12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.  
 13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
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created by the Budget Acts of 1921 and 1974, and so on.14 But outside 
the classroom, such questions do not arise in the abstract; they arise in 
the context of the concrete politics of the day. To the extent that we 
are concerned with the actual distribution of decision-making 
authority, we must go beyond the question “how is the federal budget 
passed?” and consider the question “who will decide the federal 
government’s spending priorities for next year?” 
Answering that question of course requires an engagement with 
the constitutional text. If the text gave the president unilateral 
spending authority, then our inquiry about who sets spending 
priorities would be almost entirely White-House-focused; conversely, 
if the text exempted appropriations from the presentment 
requirement, we would focus much more on Capitol Hill. But the 
constitutional text is best understood as setting the ground rules, the 
parameters, within which different actors contest with one another for 
decision-making authority over the politically relevant question: Who 
will determine our spending priorities? Answering that question 
requires going beyond the formalist text, but it does not lead us to 
functionalist considerations of comparative institutional competence, 
nor does it suggest that settlements reached in one era ossify into a 
“historical gloss” that binds future eras. Rather, it requires 
attentiveness to the surrounding politics—it requires us to look 
beyond the institutions in Washington and consider the various ways 
in which they engage with their publics. Thus, one cannot understand 
why the extremely vague appropriations of the late 1780s and early 
1790s (the first appropriations bill divided spending into only four 
categories15) became the far more detailed appropriations bills of the 
mid-1790s and early 1800s without an awareness of the rise of parties 
and partisan conflict in that era. Nor can one understand the rise of 
presidential dominance in budgetary matters, inaugurated with the 
1921 Budget Act, without an understanding of the growth of the 
administrative state and the pressures that put on congressional 
budgeting. Nor can one understand why and how Congress chose to 
reassert itself beginning in the 1970s without knowing something 
about the distrust of the presidency engendered by the Nixon 
 
 14. See generally STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 105TH CONG., THE 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS: AN EXPLANATION (Comm. Print 1998); ALLEN SCHICK, 
THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS (3d ed. 2007); Chafetz, Congress’s 
Constitution, supra note 10, at 727–30. 
 15. See Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 23, 1 Stat. 95, 95.  
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administration. More recently, one cannot understand budget 
brinkmanship during the Obama presidency without understanding 
the terms on which the 2010, 2012, and 2014 elections were fought.16 
These are constitutional questions—which is to say, they are questions 
over the distribution of authority to make decisions of policy—but 
they are understandable only by reference to political context. 
Much as the distribution of budgetary authority varies as a 
function of the surrounding politics, so too does the distribution of 
appointments authority. Again, the constitutional text is relatively 
concise and familiar, with its provisions for the advice-and-consent 
appointments of all principal and some inferior officers, the ability of 
Congress to vest “by Law” the appointment of other inferior officers 
in “the President alone, the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of 
Departments,” and the creation of a recess-appointments 
mechanism.17 A more detailed formalist account would also consider 
the history of statutory mechanisms like acting appointments and 
provisions dealing with government employees, as opposed to 
officers. But once again these formal observations—while necessary 
to understanding the appointments power—are far from sufficient. 
They do nothing to help us understand why some presidents, at some 
moments, have enjoyed a nearly free hand in putting their people in 
office, while other presidents, at other times, have faced significant 
congressional pushback. Without understanding the politics of the 
mid-1830s, it is hard to understand why the Senate twice rejected 
Andrew Jackson’s nomination of Roger Brooke Taney in 1834–1835 
(once as Treasury Secretary and once as a Supreme Court Justice) 
before confirming him as Chief Justice in 1836. Or consider John 
Tyler, who, although elected to the Vice Presidency on the Whig 
ticket, saw a Whig-dominated Senate take much more of the 
appointments power on itself, rejecting an unprecedented percentage 
(and, indeed, one not equaled since) of Tyler’s nominees. Without 
knowing that Tyler was a Whig of convenience, rather than one of 
principle, that he became President when William Henry Harrison 
died a month after taking office (thus earning Tyler the derisive 
nickname “His Accidency”), and that Tyler was, in fact, expelled 
from the Whig Party mere months after becoming President, one 
cannot begin to understand why he faced such resistance in the 
 
 16. All of this budgetary political history, and a great deal more, is lovingly traced in 
CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at ch. 4.  
 17. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2–3.  
CHAFETZ IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2015  2:33 AM 
166 DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [Vol. 64:161 
appointments sphere. Likewise, it would be hard to understand why 
Eisenhower’s nomination of Lewis Strauss as Secretary of Commerce 
failed in 1959 without knowing that nearly all of the plausible 
Democratic candidates for president in 1960 were in the Senate.18 
Once again, the distribution of decision-making authority—which is 
to say, of constitutional authority—depends on the political context 
and the various actors’ political moves, as played out on a field that is 
defined and constrained by constitutional text. 
II.  THE MULTIPLICITY-BASED ACCOUNT  
AND RECESS APPOINTMENTS 
Let’s return, then, to the topic of Krotoszynski’s article: recess 
appointments and the Noel Canning decision.19 What would a 
multiplicity-based account emphasize that Krotoszynski does not? 
First, it would emphasize what actually gave rise to the facts of Noel 
Canning: not a Senate majority that refused to confirm the 
President’s nominees, but rather a Senate minority that was engaged 
in wholesale obstruction using the filibuster.20 None of the Noel 
Canning opinions use the word “filibuster,” nor does Krotoszynski’s 
article.21 And yet, the President’s unprecedented assertion that he 
could unilaterally declare the Senate to be in recess can only be 
understood in light of the fact that it was minority obstruction, rather 
than majority disagreement, that was preventing these nominees from 
being confirmed in the first place. It enabled Obama to make a 
completely different sort of argument in the public sphere: instead of 
claiming that he, as President, had some sort of “right” to have his 
nominees confirmed, he could assert that minority obstruction—not 
even giving nominees an up-or-down vote!22—was illegitimate and 
 
 18. The political history of the appointments power is detailed in CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at ch. 5.  
 19. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).  
 20. See Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, supra note 10, at 764–66 (noting the use of the 
filibuster against a number of Obama’s nominees and Obama’s eventual use of the recess 
appointments at issue in Noel Canning as a response). For evidence of the transformation of the 
filibuster into a routine supermajority requirement in the years leading up to Noel Canning, see 
Josh Chafetz, The Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1003, 1008–11 (2011).  
 21. Krotoszynski does allude to the filibuster, when he writes that the nominations at issue 
in Noel Canning had been “pending before the Senate for over a year.” Krotoszynski, supra 
note 2, at 1531. However, that brief allusion plays no role in his subsequent analysis. 
 22. See Remarks at Shaker Heights High School in Shaker Heights, Ohio, 2012 DAILY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 2–3 (Jan. 4, 2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-
201200003/pdf/DCPD-201200003.pdf (“For almost half a year, Republicans in the Senate have 
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therefore justified unprecedentedly aggressive moves on his own 
part.23 
By way of contrast, when the Republican majority in the House 
of Representatives balked at raising the debt ceiling in 2011,24 Obama 
dismissed out of hand any suggestion that he rely on equally 
aggressive (or strained) legal arguments to raise the debt ceiling 
unilaterally. Obama insisted that “that’s not how our democracy 
works” because “Americans made a decision about divided 
Government,”25 and it was not his place to override that decision. 
Indeed, he made the majoritarian premise explicit: “My challenge, 
then, is I’ve got to get something passed. I’ve got to get 218 votes in 
the House of Representatives.”26 In the appointments context, 
however, he railed against the notion that he had to get sixty votes. In 
other words, at nearly the same time, Obama was willing to stretch 
the boundaries of the recess-appointments power but unwilling to 
stretch other powers in order to avoid a default on the debt. And the 
reasons sounded in the surrounding politics, and specifically in the 
President’s confidence that he could win the public politics of evading 
minority obstruction, but he could not win the public politics of 
evading the preferences of a House majority.27 
Indeed, this political valence of the filibuster became even 
clearer about a month and a half before Noel Canning was argued, 
 
blocked Richard [Cordray]’s confirmation. They refused to even give Richard an up-or-down 
vote . . . . But when Congress refuses to act, and as a result, hurts our economy and puts our 
people at risk, then I have an obligation as President to do what I can without them. I’ve got an 
obligation to act on behalf of the American people. And I’m not going to stand by while a 
minority in the Senate puts party ideology ahead of the people that we were elected to serve.”). 
 23. See David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 46 (2014) 
(noting, with reference to recess appointments, that “allegations that another branch has 
engaged in unprecedented or destructive behavior can almost always be mobilized to support a 
claim of enhanced discretion”). As Pozen notes, the fact that our legal separation-of-powers 
discourse tends to be inattentive to political context has “driven a wedge” between the 
justifications offered to the general public and those offered in “official legal scripts,” which 
“have effaced the actual motivations and developments that seem to be driving some of [the 
Obama Administration’s] most controversial behaviors.” Id. at 77–78. 
 24. See, e.g., David A. Fahrenthold, Some in GOP See Little Crisis in the Debt-Ceiling 
Crisis, WASH. POST, July 15, 2011, at A6 (noting House Republican opposition to raising the 
debt ceiling without significant policy concessions from Democrats). 
 25. Remarks at a Town Hall Meeting and a Question-and-Answer Session in College Park, 
Maryland, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 7 (July 22, 2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201100516/pdf/DCPD-201100516.pdf.  
 26. Id. at 6.  
 27. See Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065, 
2082–84 (2013) (discussing the politics of the filibuster in the public sphere).  
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when the Senate Democratic majority (invoking what supporters call 
the “constitutional option” and opponents call the “nuclear option”) 
eliminated the filibuster for all nominees other than those to the 
Supreme Court.28 As a result, nominees that the Democratic majority 
in the Senate wanted to prioritize had been getting confirmed for 
more than seven months before the Court ruled in Noel Canning.29 By 
the time Justice Breyer wrote his opinion, any worries about a Senate 
minority indefinitely holding up appointments across the board had 
dissipated. One might well wonder whether this newfound ability of 
the Senate to confirm nominees made it easier for Breyer and some 
of his colleagues to rule against the administration on recess 
appointments. In any case, an account of the recent controversies 
over recess appointments that ignores this essential political context 
seems to me to be an unnecessarily impoverished one. 
Krotoszynski suggests that the Senate’s failure to confirm 
nominees is inconsistent with the principles underlying the Article II 
Vesting Clause, the Take Care Clause, and the Opinions Clause.30 
The acontextual nature of this argument suggests that it is equally 
true regardless of whether that failure results from minority 
obstruction in the Senate (as it did between 2010 and late 2013) or 
from a Senate majority’s refusal to confirm nominees (as we may see 
in the current, 114th Congress). But the politics are radically 
different, and options that may have been politically feasible for the 
President under the former scenario are largely foreclosed under the 
latter. 
Bringing politics back into the equation does not simply allow us 
to better understand what is going on in actual separation-of-powers 
conflicts; it also allows us to come to more sophisticated normative 
judgments about those conflicts. In this vein, consider an alternative 
defense of the result in Noel Canning, one that is more attentive to 
 
 28. See 159 CONG. REC. S8414–28 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 2013); Paul Kane, Senate Eliminates 
Filibusters on Most Nominees, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2013, at A1. 
 29. Anne O’Connell’s fascinating contribution to this Symposium makes it clear that 
Senate Democrats seem to have prioritized judicial confirmations, with both failure rates and 
length of time to confirmation dropping for judges after filibuster reform, while time-to-
confirmation went up for all other nominations, and failure rates were mixed. Anne Joseph 
O’Connell, Shortening Agency and Judicial Vacancies Through Filibuster Reform? An 
Examination of Confirmation Rates and Delays from 1981 to 2014, 64 DUKE L.J. 1645, 1676–78 
(2015)   
 30. Krotoszynski, supra note 2, at 1522, 1523, 1546, 1549–50.   
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the surrounding politics.31 Under the Adjournment Clauses, neither 
house can adjourn for more than three days without the consent of 
the other,32 but, if the houses cannot agree as to the time of 
adjournment, then the president “may adjourn them to such Time as 
he shall think proper.”33 Importantly, a motion to adjourn is non-
debatable,34 which means that it cannot be filibustered. A majority 
can cause the Senate (or the House) to adjourn at any time, but they 
can only adjourn for more than three days if they both adjourn 
together. Under Noel Canning, an adjournment of ten days or more 
qualifies as a recess allowing the president to make recess 
appointments.35 Also under Noel Canning, the Senate’s determination 
of whether or not it is in recess is authoritative—it can hold pro forma 
sessions every three days to keep the length of any given recess to less 
than three days.36 Now, consider how all of these interlocking formal 
pieces interact with different political possibilities: 
(1)  Suppose that a Senate majority wants a president to be able 
to make recess appointments (presumably because minority 
obstruction prevents the majority from simply confirming nominees). 
The majority can vote to adjourn for ten or more days. The House 
would then have two choices: it could consent, in which case the 
recess would be long enough to justify recess appointments under 
Noel Canning. Or it could refuse consent, in which case there would 
be disagreement between the houses as to the time of adjournment, 
and the president could adjourn them to such time as he thinks 
proper. So long as he thinks it proper to adjourn them for more than 
ten days, the recess would be long enough to justify recess 
appointments under Noel Canning. In short, President + Senate 
Majority = Recess Appointments (in those situations in which it does 
not simply equal confirmation of the nominee). 
 
 31. Given that no American president has ever exercised his Article II power to adjourn 
the houses of Congress, this defense of Noel Canning may also be an example of the sort of 
innovation in separation-of-powers arrangements for which Gillian Metzger advocates in her 
contribution to this Symposium. See Gillian E. Metzger, Appointments, Innovation, and the 
Judicial–Political Divide, 64 DUKE L.J. 1607, 1636–43 (2015).  
 32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4.  
 33. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 34. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, at 15 (2013) (R. XXII(1)). This 
is not a quirk of Senate rules, but rather a widely accepted principle of parliamentary practice. 
See HENRY M. ROBERT, ROBERT’S RULES OF ORDER REVISED 5 (Morrow Quill Paperbacks 
1979) (1915).  
 35. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2567 (2014).  
 36. Id. at 2573–77.  
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(2)  Suppose that a House majority wants a president to be able 
to make recess appointments (perhaps because the same party 
controls the House and presidency, while the other party controls the 
Senate). The House majority can vote to adjourn for ten or more 
days. The Senate would then have two choices: it could consent, in 
which case the recess would be long enough to justify recess 
appointments under Noel Canning. Or it could refuse consent, in 
which case there would be disagreement between the houses as to the 
time of adjournment, and the president could adjourn them to such 
time as he thinks proper. So long as he thinks it proper to adjourn 
them for more than ten days, the recess would be long enough to 
justify recess appointments under Noel Canning. In short, President + 
House Majority = Recess Appointments. 
(3)  Suppose that neither chamber has a majority that wants the 
president to be able to make recess appointments. In that case, the 
chambers can simply work together to ensure that they agree on the 
timing of adjournments and that they are never adjourned for ten 
days or more, which means that there will never be a recess giving rise 
to the opportunity for recess appointments.37 In short, President alone 
= No Recess Appointments. 
This almost certainly was not what Justice Breyer intended, but 
notice how nicely politically calibrated it all is. Given the different, 
but cross-cutting, lifespans and constituencies of each of the three 
institutions (House, Senate, and presidency), a party that controls at 
least two of them can be said to be winning the public political battle 
in an at least somewhat sustained way.38 Consider that, in the last 
eighteen elections (1980–2014, inclusive), there have only been either 
three or four times, depending on how one counts, when more than 
one of these institutions simultaneously switched partisan control.39 
 
 37. The “never” in that sentence perhaps deserves qualification. As I read it, Noel Canning 
is unclear as to whether the ten-day floor applies to intersession recesses or just intrasession 
recesses. If it applies to both, then concerted action by the House and Senate really could ensure 
that a president could never make recess appointments. However, if any intersession 
adjournment (as well as intrasession adjournments lasting ten days or more) allows for recess 
appointments, then presidents could always take the intersession opportunity to make recess 
appointments. In this, they would be following the august example of Teddy Roosevelt, who 
made more than 160 recess appointments in an infinitesimally short intersession recess in 1903. 
The incident is recounted in Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2563. 
 38. For an analogous argument about unified government (i.e., all three in the same 
hands), see Chafetz, supra note 27, at 2075–77.  
 39. In 1980, both the Senate and the presidency flipped from Democratic to Republican 
control. In 1994, both the House and the Senate flipped from Democratic to Republican 
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Controlling more than one simultaneously is thus the result either of 
having several good election cycles in a row or of a true wave 
election. Either way, it says something about that party’s success in 
engaging with the electorate. And when a party has enjoyed that 
success and controls at least two of those institutions, it exercises 
more of the appointments power. If the president’s party also controls 
the Senate, then (post-filibuster-reform) he should be able to get his 
nominees confirmed, but even if he cannot, he should be able to make 
recess appointments. If the president’s party controls the House but 
not the Senate, he should be able to make recess appointments. And 
if the party that controls both the House and the Senate does not 
control the presidency, then it should be able to prevent any 
appointments, recess or otherwise, that it wishes to prevent. (This is 
all, of course, subject to the usual caveats about the imperfect nature 
of partisan discipline.) A broader democratic mandate for one party 
translates into that party’s exercising a larger share of the 
appointments power. Assuming that we want elections to matter, this 
seems to be a normatively attractive way to view the appointments 
power. 
CONCLUSION 
The multiplicity-based account of the separation of powers thus 
has both descriptive and normative virtues over straight formalism, 
straight functionalism, or Krotoszynski’s pragmatic formalist hybrid. 
Descriptively, by focusing on political context, the multiplicity-based 
 
control. And in 2006, both the House and the Senate flipped from Republican to Democratic 
control. The wildcard (of course) is the 2000 election, where the presidency flipped from 
Democratic to Republican control, see generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); the House 
remained in Republican hands; and the Senate (which had previously been under Republican 
control) was split 50-50. That meant that, between January 3 and January 20, 2001, Vice 
President Al Gore cast the tie-breaking vote, and the Senate was in Democratic hands. On 
January 20, Dick Cheney became Vice President, returning the Senate to Republican control. 
On May 24, 2001, Senator James Jeffords of Vermont left the Republican Party and began 
caucusing with the Democrats, returning the chamber to Democratic control, where it remained 
for the rest of that Congress. Even if one counts the 2000 election as one in which two of the 
three institutions changed hands, that makes only four out of the last eighteen, or 22.2 percent. 
For the partisan control of the House, Senate, and presidency at the beginning of each Congress 
through the 112th, see CQ PRESS, HOW CONGRESS WORKS 227–28 (5th ed. 2013). For the 
results of the 2012 elections, see Karen Tumulty, With Status Quo Intact, More Gridlock to 
Come, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2012, at A41. For the results of the 2014 election, see Karen 
Tumulty, New Majority Likely to Mean Same Gridlock, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2014, at A1. For 
the effects of Jeffords’s switch, see Emily Langer, Senator Walked Away from GOP During 
Final Term, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2014, at B4. 
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account can help us understand actually occurring separation-of-
powers conflicts, not just classroom hypotheticals. Constitutional 
disputes are always politically situated. If we lose sight of the political 
context, then we are left with underdeterminate formalist tools, 
functionalist claims about comparative institutional competence that 
frequently fail to carry the day, and arguments from historical gloss 
that cannot by themselves tell us which history is relevant or how. A 
focus on politics, which of course takes place within a framework 
shaped by formalist tools and the gloss of past practice, binds these 
elements together, allowing us to see how actors make use of formal 
tools, historical precedents, functionalist arguments, and whatever 
else is to hand in the service of contesting for decision-making 
authority in the moment. 
Normatively, the focus on politics allows our separation-of-
powers analysis to keep sight of important values of self-governance.40 
It emphasizes the success or failure of political actors’ engagement in 
the public sphere, which means that the focus is turned outward from 
governing institutions to focus more on those institutions’ 
engagements with their publics. Whether formalist, functionalist, or 
pragmatic formalist, a separation-of-powers theory that has nothing 
to say about engagements with the public—which is to say, one that 
ignores politics—is a democratically impoverished one. 
 
 
 40. The normative dimension of the multiplicity-based conception of the separation of 
powers is discussed in significantly more detail in CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 10, at ch. 2.  
